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A consensus is emerging that votes at work promote good corporate
governance, argues Ewan McGaughey. Here he outlines behavioural,
qualitative and quantitative evidence, and explains that votes at work in
Britain have among the longest, richest histories in the world.
The UK is about to stop shareholders monopolising votes for company
boards, with worker voice. Currently, asset managers control most
shareholder votes in public companies. They have systemic conflicts of interest, because
shareholder votes can influence companies to buy asset managers’ financial products
(e.g. defined contribution pensions). But now this is changing. One small step, following
government consultation, is that the Financial Reporting Council will write new ‘comply or
explain’ rules in the UK Corporate Governance Code, so that listed companies introduce:
(1) ‘a designated non-executive director’ responsible for employee engagement, (2) ‘a
formal employee advisory council’ or (3) ‘a director from the workforce’.
Theory and evidence on votes at work
Without any credible evidence, a minority of corporate lawyers and economists still argue
that worker voice will damage productivity. For example, Oliver Williamson argued
shareholders make ‘firm-specific investments’ that cannot be protected without
controlling boards. Others argued it is essential that every voting right ‘flows with the
residual interest in the firm’. These arguments had no empirical basis, and even in their
own theoretical terms, no factual basis. Shareholders, who exercise votes, are mostly
asset managers and banks. They make no firm-specific investments at all. They bear no
risk from insolvency. They appropriate votes on ‘other people’s money’. The true, ultimate
investors are beneficiaries of pension funds, life-insurance policies or mutual funds:
usually employees saving for retirement.
A second type of argument is that with multiple interests on boards, people will squabble
and business will become slower. This theory was advanced in valuable work by Detlev
Vagts and Henry Hansmann. But the same argument was used by Johannes Zahn, the
Nazi banker and corporate lawyer who drafted the German Public Companies Act 1937.
Zahn wanted banks and boards to control everything, so ‘democracy of capital will vanish
just as it did in politics’. After WW2, the reverse happened: capital dispersed, and votes
at work have spread, with a majority of OECD (and EU) countries now having some form
of codetermination law.
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Yet a third argument is that codetermination does not happen voluntarily, only by
coercive law, because it is inherently inefficient. This is historically inaccurate.
Elsewhere, I have explained how codetermination in Germany began with collective
agreements, which only later were codified by law. But also, behavioural, qualitative, and
quantitative empirical evidence strongly suggests votes at work are essential for
productive companies.
First, behavioural evidence supports ‘the participation hypothesis’. That is, ‘changes in
human behavior can be brought about rapidly only if people ‘participate in deciding what
the change shall be and how it shall be made.’ Votes at work also empower people to
ensure they are fairly paid. All modern behavioural evidence suggests that, unless
people are fairly treated and paid, they lose motivation to work. The arguments of Ronald
Coase or Easterbrook and Fischel, that distribution is unconnected to efficient
production, are evidence-free.
Second, qualitative evidence supports worker voice, not least because conflicts need to
be resolved, not suppressed. But also, multiple interest groups on boards can and do
work well. In 1978, worker representation at the UK Post Office board was lauded in its
own annual report as having ‘contributed much to the major decisions that have to be
taken about the future’. Similarly, long experience in UK pension funds shows ‘on the
whole they function as relatively harmonious bodies’. By contrast, there is no evidence
beyond anecdote to show that codetermined boards do not work well.
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Third, preliminary quantitative evidence suggests legal systems with votes at work are
superior in productivity and economic development. Cambridge’s Centre for Business
Research has compiled a Labour Regulation Index of 117 countries’ labour laws, and
their change since 1970. Results are still in preliminary stages, but will probably confirm
what behavioural and qualitative evidence has already said: votes at work are essential
for long-term success of companies.
History of British codetermination
The fact that there is not already a general codetermination law in the UK is surprising
because its corporations with the greatest long-term success – universities – have
incorporated worker voice at least since the Oxford University Commission of 1852.
Hardly a radical body, it was determined to reverse ‘successive interventions by which
the government of the University was reduced to a narrow oligarchy.’ Today almost all
universities ensure staff have votes at work. The LSE does it for staff and students (see
article 10.5 but see amendments). So why is there no general plan yet?
Two reasons have been (1) an old view that to get votes, people should invest property,
by buying shares and (2) uncertainty in the labour movement. Both have now gone.
Outside universities, the South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896 and the Port of London Act
1908 enabled worker representatives on boards. The Gas Act had depended on workers
investing money through an employee share scheme. This reflected old prejudice that
male ownership of property was a key to participation in public life. Yet the Port of
London Act enabled worker votes solely by the investment of labour. After WW1, Lloyd
George in coalition with Conservatives attempted to pass codetermination for Railways.
But, as a previously secret memorandum shows, it failed against management opposition
and unions who only wanted nationalisation.
Why did organised labour not bargain hard for votes at work? First, employee share
schemes had given worker representation a bad name: workers were told to save in an
Enron-style undiversified portfolio, and given no meaningful voice. As LSE founders
Sidney and Beatrice Webb said, employee share schemes were advocated ‘by the most
reactionary persons’. Second, it was recognised by the Webbs after WW1 that worker
representation, purely by investment of labour, could be ‘a real social gain’. But Sidney
Webb was also writing the UK Labour Party’s clause IV, committing to ‘nationalisation of
the means of production’. The drive for public ownership was conflated with worker
voice, as if socialisation of ownership was necessary for socialisation of power. At the
same time, British labour with government support, had substantial influence (if not real
votes) through strong union membership, collective bargaining, and strikes. Voice at
work with collective bargaining created prosperity and a more equal society. But it was all
destroyed from 1979. Unions’ decline and soaring inequality were a mirror image:
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Over the mid-20  century, through labour policy documents, trade unions were a ‘single
channel’ of voice, and there were many codetermination experiments. The Iron and Steel
Act 1967, the Industry Act 1975, and the Post Office Act 1977 all required worker
directors. The Bullock Report of 1977 proposed a general Act, but it divided all sides.
Half the board would be worker representatives, half shareholders, and a government
representative would break any deadlock. Such detailed plans, rather than minimum
standards, could not command enough consensus. After the government flipped its
proposals to a two-tier board structure, and its White Paper flopped, the 1979 election
seemed to be the end.
Or not quite ‘the end’. Universities still had codetermination. Moreover, collective
agreements for pension plan management ensured codetermination in worker capital.
After a scandal of pensions being stolen by Robert Maxwell, the Conservative
government passed the Pensions Act 1995, for one third representation in all pensions
unless firms positively opted out. The Pensions Act 2004 removed the opt-out. The
Secretary of State may require one-half by statutory instrument. It is not the world’s best
system: Australia, Belgium or Sweden do better. But, surprisingly, British codetermination
in pensions supports more worker voice than in Germany. Far from an alien tradition,
British codetermination has among the richest histories in the world.
Proposals today
This leads to the essential question: how should companies, employees, and unions
build votes at work today? It is essential to keep in mind that if Labour regains office,
corporate governance will reform further. At Labour’s 2016 conference, policy ‘Composite
4’ committed to reform. This means, said the Shadow Chancellor, adopting the Manifesto
for Labour Law. This says every ‘board must have worker directors’ and that workers
th
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‘should have a minimum percentage of the vote in general meetings of the company’.
This is what British universities have done for centuries. The need for votes at work are a
new political consensus in Britain: the question is not so much ‘if’, but ‘how’.
So, how should companies and trade unions approach the Financial Report Council’s
options? Given the social and economic benefits from embracing employee voice, the
most advisable approach for corporate boardrooms would be to get ahead of the curve.
They can look to successful competitors across Europe – in the Netherlands, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway – for advice. There are three further points to consider.
First, by far the simplest option will be that the workforce elects at least one director. Two
worker directors will bring diversity and mutual support. Trade unions may well bargain to
choose the board representatives, so it is important to understand there are many
alternative models. For instance, trade unions already nominate many pension trustees,
but also many have workforce ballots and unions put up candidates. Abroad, employees
may delegate votes to their union, or their vote can be automatically delegated unless
employees opt to send instructions.
Second, there is a choice about the range of employees to include. Again, the simplest
option is to ensure employees of the corporate group (readily defined for group accounts
and tax) are included in ballots for the board. A successful company will see every
reason to include workers from its subsidiaries overseas. All voting can be arranged
electronically with simple, safe software.
Third, a union’s support will be essential in ensuring good communication with the
workforce. One of the best reasons for voice on boards has always been the reduction of
industrial conflict. The overwhelming experience is that worker representatives will
genuinely seek to defend employees’ interests, but do so in a cooperative way.
Employees and unions will want meaningful progress. So will member nominated
trustees in pension funds. If it can be done – and there is every indication it can – worker
voice will promote the success of all companies.
______
Note: the above draws on the author’s published work in Industrial Law Journal and free
to read on SSRN (Votes at work in Britain: Shareholder Monopolisation and the ‘Single
Channel’).
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